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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a spatial role-based
authorization framework which speciﬁes authorization based
on both role and location constrains in a wireless local area
network with assistance from a sensor network. The framework
performs a location-restricted veriﬁcation scheme before granting
a user with privileges for crucial resources access. Analysis and
simulation results show that our framework can provide double-
check safeguard to conﬁdential information, so that potential
attackers cannot access the resource outside the permitted region,
even though their role is veriﬁed.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of wireless communications, an in-
creasing number of Wireless LANs (WLANs) has replaced
traditional wired networks in many ofﬁce buildings. This trend
introduces more security challenges in an organization. For
instance, in wired networks, an intruder has to connect to a
port to access the network resource. If the intruder cannot
access a port, he cannot access data even if he gets credentials.
WLANs, however, broadcast messages by using radio channel.
Therefore, intruders can access to network resource from any
location within the coverage. Although many schemes such
as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access
(WPA), WPA2, etc. were developed for guaranteing reasonable
level of security, an intruder who gets credentials still can
access resource from physically remote location. Moreover,
in wired networks, if an intruder connects to a port and
begins transmitting packets, these packets can be traced to the
port connected, and the intruder’s machine can be physically
located and disconnected. However, in wireless networks, the
intruder’s machine is associated with a given Access Point
(AP), and it is not enough to physically locate it.
To prevent the above mentioned security threats, we propose
a spatial role-based framework for ofﬁce buildings based on
sensor network-assisted indoor WLANs. Our scheme can be
used for different scenarios. For example, in a school, a teacher
may want students to take an on-line exam using a WLAN.
Access privileges and locations have to be constrained for
preventing candidates from looking for answers on the Internet
and from ”ringers” who take tests for other students outside
exam room by using their credentials.
The framework performs authorization checks before al-
lowing a localization service to locate a mobile terminal
within a speciﬁc position covered by a wireless network.
The key purpose of checking location is to conﬁrm that
the requesting mobile terminal is within area associated with
access permission. The location veriﬁcation scheme proposed
in this paper provides additional safeguard that protect critical
information. Performance evaluation of the proposed scheme
in an ofﬁce environment is also given in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion II, we introduce necessary background and related work.
In Section III, we present the overview of our authorization
framework. In Section IV, we describe an application scenario
of our framework. The performance of our framework in an
ofﬁce environment is evaluated in Section V, and ﬁnally the
paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
To set the scene of this paper, we begin with some back-
ground information on distance estimation techniques, role
based authorization, and location determination which are
relevant to our framework.
A. Distance estimation techniques
Many proposals about distance estimation based on different
techniques have been developed. Generally speaking,there are
four main categories namely, Received-Signal-Strength (RSS),
Time-Difference-of-Arrival (TDoA), Time-of-Arrival (ToA),
and Angle-of-Arrival (AoA). This section introduces two of
these approaches in brief.
Received Signal Strength: RSS [1] measures the distance
based on the strength of signal received. Let us denote this
received signal strength by Pr(d). The received signal strength
can be expressed by Pr(d) =
cPt
dα , where Pt is the transmitted
signal strength, d is the distance between transmitter and
receiver, c is the path loss model parameter, and α is the path
loss coefﬁcient. Therefore, the distance d can be calculated as
d = α
√
cPt
Pr(d)
.
Time Difference of Arrival: TDoA [2] computes the distance
based on the arrived time difference of broadcast radio(Radio
Frequency, RF) and Ultrasound (US). When the transmitter
sends the RF and US signals at the same time, the receiver
will receive two signals at different times because the speeds
of these two signals are different. The arrived time difference
of RF and US can be calculated as TUS−TRF , where TUS is
the arrived time of US, and TRF is the arrived time of RF.
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B. Role based authorization
Traditional authorization speciﬁes the access rights of indi-
vidual users. In mobile computing environment, the Spatial
Role Based Access Control (SRBAC) model where spatial
location of users were used as authorization parameters was
ﬁrst proposed in [3], and later elaborated in [4]. SRBAC
supports spatial constraints on enabling and disabling of roles,
and can be used to constrain the set of permissions available
to the roles that a user may activate at a given location. The
authors in [5] proposed a location mapping function between
physical and logical locations allows roles depending on the
user’s logical location. They based on the Google Maps API
to get the location of users.
C. Location determination
There are several location awareness schemes with different
techniques for both indoor and outdoor position estimation of
mobile terminals.
The authors in [6] proposed a hybrid TDoA/RSS solution to
estimate location of mobile terminals. In this scheme, sensors
compute the distance between them and transmitters which
send the signals they received based on RSS and TDoA. As
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Fig. 1. Example of TDOA.
shown in Fig. 1, Distance = (TUS−TSEND) ∗VUS, where TUS
denotes the time when US signal arrivals the sensor, TSEND
denotes the time when transmitters send the US signal, and
VUS denotes the speed of the sound signal. However, since
time synchronization is a difﬁcult task in sensor networks,
sensors which receive the signals can’t compute the distance
by using TSEND. Since the speed of RF is much faster than
the speed of US and the time of RF propagation is almost
equal to zero for short distances, the authors assume TRF −
TSEND = 0 (the time of RF propagation), and use TUS−TRF
instead of TUS−TSEND. Thus the distance between sensor and
transmitters can be computed as Distance = (TUS−TRF)∗VUS.
Using three non-collinear sensor nodes with known po-
sitions, a set of three equations is derived based on the
trilateration and Pythagorean Theorem. The mean square error
can be computed based on the set of three equations. Further-
more, in order to get more accurate location of the mobile
terminals, the author gets the mean of I iterations which are
collected in different time. Therefore, RSS can be expressed
as d(mean) = 1
I
I
∑
i=1
d(i), where d(mean) denotes the mean of
distance estimated by RSS; and TDoA can be expressed as
D(mean) =
VUS
I
I
∑
i=1
(TUS(i)−TRF(i)), where D(mean) denotes
the mean of distance determined by TDoA.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE AUTHORIZATION FRAMEWORK
In this section we introduce the network architecture of our
framework, and demonstrate how our framework authorizes
access based on both role and location, and ﬁnally propose an
improved time and power based localization scheme.
A. Network architecture
Based on the network architecture described in related
research [7], we propose a three-tier hierarchical network
architecture for our framework. This architecture, as depicted
in Fig. 2, consists of two kinds of networks: sensor networks
and a WLAN. The sensor network is divided into several
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Fig. 2. An architecture for spatial role-based authorization scheme where
the location of a mobile terminal is determined by joint operation of agent,
relay and manager sensor nodes.
groups. There are three types of sensor nodes in each group:
agent sensor nodes, relay sensor nodes, and manager sensor
nodes. The agent sensor nodes attached to the mobile terminals
communicate with the relay sensor nodes and send e.g. RF and
US signals which will be sensed by relay sensor nodes. The
relay sensor nodes distributed in the coverage area of an AP
are responsible for recording the arrived time difference of
the RF and US signals broadcasted by agent nodes, sensing
the strength of the arrived signals, and forwarding them to the
manager node of their group. Each group has a group leader
called manager sensor node, which is attached to AP. The
manage sensor node is used to collect distance messages, esti-
mate the location of the mobile terminals, broadcast messages
to the sensor nodes, and transmit the location messages to the
AP attached to it.
The choice of communication technology is critically impor-
tant. There are several aspects that should be considered such
as energy efﬁciency, adequate data rate, reduced size and low
price of sensor nodes. Because of that ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4)
may be seen as suitable communication technology for sensor
networks.
B. Location veriﬁcation service
The location determination in our framework is considered
as a Location Veriﬁcation Service, which relies on the sensor
networks. The relay sensor nodes distributed in the ofﬁce
environment which is covered by WLANs are responsible
for sensing and estimating the location of the agent sensor
nodes. When they receive the requests from their neighbor
agent sensor nodes, they begin to record the arriving time
difference of e.g. RF and US signal and sense the strength
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of them, and then they send the messages which contain the
distance information of the agent sensor nodes to the manager
sensor nodes which are the nearest ones from them via other
relay sensor nodes. Manager sensors attached to APs collect
messages from their neighbor relay sensor nodes and transmit
to the server via the AP attached by them.
Whenever a user with mobile terminal wants to access
the protected important information, the location veriﬁcation
service will perform a set of checks. These checks include
authenticating whether the username and password of the re-
questing user are matched, conﬁrming whether the role has the
permission to access the location service, determining whether
the location of the requesting mobile terminal is allowed.
These processes are illustrated in Fig. 3, and explained step-
by-step as follows:
1. A user with mobile terminal wants to access the protected
important information and is asked to send username and
password to the Server.
2. The Server requests the user’s authorization data from
the Authorization Database (ADB).
3. The ADB returns the user’s authorization data. The Server
authenticates whether the role of the user has the right to
request the permission of the location service. The Server
rejects the access request if the user hasn’t the privilege.
4. The Server grants the certiﬁcate of Location Veriﬁcation
Service to the Mobile Terminal if the role of the user has the
privilege.
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Fig. 3. Example of a location veriﬁcation service where a user with mobile
terminal trying to access the protected important information is constrained
by his present location.
5. The Mobile Terminal which receives the certiﬁcate of
Location Veriﬁcation Service forwards it to the Location
Veriﬁcation Service to request service.
6. The Location Veriﬁcation Service calculates the current
location of the Mobile Terminal, and sends the position of the
Mobile Terminal to the Server.
7. The Server sends a request to the Location Database
about the authorization regions of the accessed information.
The Server rejects the access request if the position of the
mobile terminal is not in these regions and allows the user
access the protected important information if the position of
the mobile terminal is in these permitted regions.
C. Role based authorization
In our scheme, as shown in Fig. 4, privileges are assigned
to users according to both their roles and their locations. That
is the privilege of a user depending dynamically on which
Users Roles PrivilegesLocation
Fig. 4. User, role, location and permission relationships
geographic zone it is currently located in, even though the
role is static for the same user.
Deﬁnition 1: The role and location based authorization
model is deﬁned as follows:
• USERS, ROLES, LOCS, and PRGS (users, roles, loca-
tions, and privileges);
• USERS, the set of U = {u1,u2, ...,ui};
• ROLES, the set of R = {r1,r2, ...,r j};
• LOCS, the set of L = {l1, l2, ..., lk}, and lm ∩ ln = φ for
m = n;
• PRGS, the set of P = {p1, p2, ..., pt};
• UA⊆USERS×ROLES, the relation that associates users
with roles, UA: User Assignment;
• PA ⊆ PRGS×ROLES× LOCS, the relation that assigns
a privilege to a role available in location. PA: Privileges
Assignment;
• assigned users : (r : ROLES)→ 2USERS, the mapping of
role r onto a set of users;
• assigned privileges : (r : ROLES, l : LOCS)→ 2PRGS, the
mapping of role r and location l onto a set of privileges.
Formally: assigned privilege(r, l)= {p∈PRGS|(p,r, l)∈
PA};
• assigned roles : (l : LOCS) → 2LOCS, the mapping of
location l onto a set of roles;
• session user(s : SESSIONS)→USERS, the mapping of
session s onto the session’s associated user;
• session roles(s : SESSIONS) → 2USERS, the mapping of
session s onto a set of roles. Formally: session roles(si)⊆
{r ∈ ROLES|(sessionuser(si),r) ∈ PA};
• session location(s : SESSIONS) → LOCS, the mapping
of session s onto the session’s associated location.
Role and location authorization: A session can never have
a privilege unless it is assigned the right role and also in the
permitted location.
User Assignment (UA): ∀s : SESSIONS,u : USERS,r :
ROLES
r ∈ session roles(s) ∧ u ∈ session user(s) ⇒ u ∈
assigned users(r)
• Assigned user: SESSIONS × ROLES × USER →
BOOLEAN;
• Assigned user(s,r,u) = 1 if session s can be assigned user
u when it is assigned a role r, 0 otherwise.
Privileges Assignment (PA): ∀s : SESSIONS, p : PRGS,r :
ROLES, and l : LOCS
r ∈ session roles(s) ∧ u ∈ session privileges(s) ∧ l ∈
session location(s)⇒ u ∈ assigned privileges(r, l)
• Assigned privilege: SESSIONS × ROLES × LOCS ×
PRGS→ BOOLEAN;
• Assigned privilege (s,r, l, p) = 1 if session s can be
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assigned privilege p when it is assigned a correct role
r and is in speciﬁed location l, 0 otherwise.
Fig. 5 illustrates the set of dynamic mapping and static
relations that are necessary for a user to get a privilege. The
dotted arrows depict dynamic mappings, and the solid arrows
depict static relations.
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Fig. 5. User u1 can get privilege p1 because p1 ∈ assigned privileges∧
r1 ∈ assigned roles∧u1 ∈ assigned users∧ l1 ∈ session locations(s1)∧ r1 ∈
session roles(s1)∧u1 ∈ session user(s1).
D. Mobile terminal authorization
In order to protect the location messages in the sensor
network, all the distance and location messages transmitted
need to be encrypted. Since sensors are constrained in com-
putation and energy resource, asymmetric key cryptography
is too expensive to adopt. Instead, we use symmetric key
cryptography solutions.
There are four kinds of keys: 1) a global symmetric key
share with all sensor nodes to provide data conﬁdentiality; 2)
a session key shared between the agent sensor node and the
group leader manager sensor node is used to provide agent
node and manager node authorization; 3) a pairwise key shared
between the relay sensor node and the group leader manager
sensor node used to provide data conﬁdentiality; 4) a pairwise
group key shared between the manager node and its neighbors’
group leader.
After the network deployment, the network planner has
to set the parameters of the relay sensor nodes that let the
nodes know their coordinates (xi,yi). When the user of a
mobile terminal wants to access some data which need location
veriﬁcation, the server would ask the user to send his UNa, Pu ,
and Gm which were broadcast by the manager sensor node, and
then verify whether they are available. If the user is permitted
to use the location veriﬁcation service, the server would
send a session key, which is computed with pseudorandom
function H to the agent node u and the manager node m as
Ku,m =H(UNa,Gm), where Ku,m denotes the session key shared
between agent node u and manager node m, UNa denotes the
user’s user name, and Gm is the index of manager sensor node
m’s group. The agent receives Ku,m, then broadcasts signal
as EK0 (EKu,m(Snum), Snum), where EK0 denotes the encryption
value using key K0, and Snum denotes the sequence number of
agent sensor node’s signal. The relay sensor nodes sense these
signals, compute the distance between them and the mobile
terminals, and send the distance message to the manager node
as EKr(EKu,m(Snum),d), where d denotes the distance between
the agent sensor node and the relay sensor node. The manage
node receives the messages sent from relay sensor nodes, and
estimates the location of the mobile terminal.
E. An improved time and power based localization scheme
The scheme which performs location veriﬁcation must be
able to obtain the location of the requesting mobile terminal in
order to conﬁrm whether the position of the requesting mobile
terminal is allowed within the wireless network.
The authors in [6] proposed a time and power based
localization scheme (TPLS). TPLS is based on TDOA and
RSS using RF and US signals to determine and to detect the
distance differences from the wireless mobile terminal to three
sensor nodes. These distance differences are averaged through
time iterations in order to reduce random effects of the noise,
shadowing and fading. They found that when the number of
iterations approaches 250, the average error distance converges
with an error of 0.5m. However, the users of the location
service suffer from a waiting time of 250 iterations despite
the time is short (maybe 20 seconds, but it is not acceptable).
We propose a new method so that the iterations not only based
on the time iteration but also based on the combination of the
distance messages of the relay sensor nodes.
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Fig. 6. Random combinations of relay sensor nodes.
As shown in Fig. 6, the manager sensor node, which collects
the distance message dru of agent sensor node u which is
sent from the relay sensor node r of its group, randomly
selects three distance message of the messages received. The
iterations I can be expressed as I =
(
n
3
)
=
n!
3!(n−3)! , where
n is the number of neighbor relay sensor nodes of agent sensor
node located. Therefore, the manager sensor node can compute
more iterations in much shorter time. Users who want to obtain
the right to access the restricted information can pass the
location veriﬁcation quickly without waiting for a long period.
IV. APPLICATION SCENARIOS
Role and location based authorization schemes will likely
play an important role in future WLANs for authorization.
Users with mobile terminals can enjoy various services and
different information because of their roles to which they
assigned and locations in which they currently locate, as one
example illustrated below.
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Fig. 7. A work path of a mobile terminal in an ofﬁce environment.
A. Indoor ofﬁce building
Let us consider an application scenario in an ofﬁce space,
as shown in Fig. 7. We just consider a simple scenario that
there are four departments in a company. The total ofﬁce space
can be divided into 6 zones, which are public zone, human
and resource department zone, research and development
zone, general manager ofﬁce, ﬁnancial department zone, and
marketing department zone. In the ofﬁce space of the company,
laptops or other mobile terminals are needed to attach to agent
sensor nodes which broadcast signals to their neighbor relay
sensor nodes if their users want to enjoy the service and infor-
mation which are needed to location veriﬁcation. In contrast,
guests of the company, who are not allowed and do not need to
access important data, can use their laptops without the agent
sensor nodes with the guest role account which has the lowest
privilege and is the most restricted in the waiting area which
is restricted by the location veriﬁcation as well. Therefore,
employees in different departments assigned to different roles
can access the services and information associated with their
corresponding departments. Eight privileges are denoted as P0,
P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, and P7. The deﬁnitions of these 8
privileges are given below:
• P0 is speciﬁed with no permission, users who get P0 can’t
access WLAN including the Internet.
• P1 is speciﬁed to guest role, user without username and
password will be assigned P1 automatically in public
zone. P1 only has the privilege which can access the
Internet or be speciﬁed some permission of the resource
of the company by the administrator.
• In public zone, clerks of the company with username and
password will be assigned P2 which can access Internet
and Intranet information of the company.
• P3-P5 are assigned to different departments, and have
the privilege to access crucial data of corresponding
department if and only if they located in speciﬁed zone.
• P7 is assigned to general manager who has the privilege
to access all key data of company only from general
manager ofﬁce.
TABLE I
PRIVILEGES WITH RESOURCES
P0 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
External Internet
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Public resource of the company
√ √ √ √ √ √
Intranet of the marketing dep.
√ √
Intranet of the human and resource dep.
√ √
Intranet of the ﬁnancial dep.
√ √
Intranet of the R&D dep.
√ √
As shown in Table 1, different privileges have variable
permission to access the resources. The key data of each
department only gives access permission to the user who
has the corresponding privilege of that department or the
privilege of the general manager. For example, P5 is assigned
to ﬁnancial department, and has the permission to access the
crucial data of ﬁnancial department only from the zone of the
marketing department and some other zones speciﬁed by the
administrator.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We implemented our authorization framework in OPNET
14.0. Unless otherwise stated, the simulation1 is set up as
follows. As shown in Fig. 7, we use 77 relay sensor nodes
and 6 manager sensor nodes uniformly distributed in the ofﬁce
space which is 50m in length and 30m in width, respectively.
Two users are considered in our simulation, user 1 is assigned
to guest role, user 2 is assigned to ﬁnancial clerk role. We
assume that a user with mobile terminal follows the red line
and walks anticlockwise around the ofﬁce space using the
guest role and ﬁnancial clerk role, respectively. The user starts
at coordinate (6, 4), gets cross (41, 4), (41, 26), (6, 26), and
ﬁnally back to (6, 4) at the speed of 1m/s. The total length
of the journey is 114m, and we can easily know that the total
time is 114 second. We sample the result every 0.05 second,
and get 2281 hits for each simulation.
In Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, the results show that these two
users spend 114 seconds to complete the journey. As our
framework expected, these two users get the same privileges
P0 they cannot access any resource when they go through
department zones. In public zone and ﬁnancial department,
they get different privileges. The user with guest role who
gets P1 can only access the external Internet in public zone and
P0 in ﬁnancial department zone; the user with ﬁnancial clerk
role getting P2 can access the Internet and public resource
of the company in public zone and P5 has the permission to
enjoy the conﬁdential information of ﬁnancial department in
ﬁnancial department zone.
In Fig. 10, we got privilege maps of performance results
with guest role, ﬁnancial role, and general manager role,
respectively. As shown in Fig. 10(a), a user with guest role
who got P1 in public zone can access the Internet rather than
the resource of the company, and P0 in department zone . In
1In this simulation, we do not consider the factor of ofﬁce wall of each
department; and the user can get cross the wall follow the red (deep dark)
line.
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Fig. 10. Privilege maps of performance results with guest role, ﬁnancial role, and general manager role.
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Fig. 9. Performance results with ofﬁce space coordinate and privilege.
Fig. 10(b), a user with ﬁnancial role who got P2 in public zone,
got P5 in ﬁnancial Dep. zone where he can enjoy conﬁdential
data of ﬁnancial Dep. and got P0 in other department zones
which means that even if a marketing clerk as an intruder got
credential of ﬁnancial role, he still got P0 in marketing Dep.
zone. In Fig. 10(c), a user with the highest privilege general
manager role who got corresponding privileges in different
department zones can access data of corresponding department
but still can access public resource of the company in public
for he got privilege P2. Therefore, the conﬁdential data of
departments will not be revealed outside the department zones,
even if the credentials are revealed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a spatial role-based autho-
rization framework for using sensor network-assisted indoor
WLANs. With this framework, administrators not only can
constrain intruders with correct credentials access to the con-
ﬁdential information when they are out of the zone speciﬁed
but also can locate where the intruder mobile terminals are.
Users have to not only use the legal username and password
but also be located at the speciﬁed zones in order to access
conﬁdential resources. With this scheme, crucial resources are
protected by two level authorization mechanisms. Our frame-
work also improves the time and power based localization
scheme from time iteration to random combination iteration
which takes a shorter time to position mobile terminals, and
performs location authorization checks before allowing a user
to access crucial resource. To evaluate the performance of
our framework, we conduct several simulations in an ofﬁce
environment. The simulation results show that the proposed
framework can constrain users’ privileges depending on their
location, and provide additional safeguard for access to crucial
information.
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